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"Strong on the Merits and Powerfully Symbolic"
THE RETURN OF BLUE LAKE TO TAOS PUEBLO

Andrew Graybill

Introduction

B

e~een 188 7 and 1934, Native American communities in the United

States lost more than one hundred million acres ofland. ' Stripped of
aboriginal title to their ancestral areas, Indians across the country, but especially those in the West, could only watch as ranchers, state governments, and
federal agencies seized their treasured homes in the name of progress and
conservation. The Taos Indians of northern New Mexico proved to be no
exception, although they had lived in their adobe pueblo, one of the oldest
continually inhabited structures in North America, for more than five hundred years. z In November 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt signed a proclamation establishing the Taos Forest Reserve, a decision that withdrew
thousands of acres ofland from the Taos Reservation and placed it under the
control of the federal government, specifically the Forest Service. Roosevelt,
·an avid outdoorsman, was determined to protect America's vanishing wood-
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lands, and Gifford Pinchot, chief of the Forest Service, personally recommended the area around the Taos Pueblo to Roosevelt.
The Taos property that became part ofthe Carson National Forest in 1908
was immensely important to the fifteen hundred Indians living in the pueblo.
Generations of their ancestors had raised crops and grazed livestock on the
tall grasses that dotted the plateau, but more worrisome by far to the Indians
than the potential loss of agricultural territorywas the threat posed to Blue
Lake, the shrine most important to the practice of their religion. Located
high in the nearby Sangre de Cristo Mountains, Blue Lake stood at the center of the vast swath of real estate claimed by the United States government
in 1906. Convinced that federal management would lead inevitably to the
destruction of their open-air sanctuary and, in turn, the decline of the Taos
Indians themselves, the group began a sixty-four-year battle to reclaim the
area. Enlisting the support of several eastern philanthropic organizations,
most notably the Association on American Indian Affairs (MIA), the Taos
argued that only the return of the Blue Lake lands-and not monetary compensation, as was customary-would provide them adequate redress.
During the relatively quiet years in the struggle, between 1906 and 1945,
the Taos made regular but cautious appeals to the government, all of which
were rejected in part or in whole. The advent of MIA involvement in the
case in 1950 and the Indians' filing of a petition with the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) the following year, however, brought increased opposition
from federal and state governments during the 1950S and 1960s. Much of this
resistance emanated from the offices of New Mexico senator Clinton P. Anderson and the Department ofAgriculture. Both worried that a return ofland
to the pueblo would set a dangerous precedent and open the door for other
Indian groups to press for real estate settlements - ranging from land restitution to money. According to Anderson's estimates, such claims could apply
to more than ninety percent of United States territory. Nevertheless, in 1970
President Richard M. Nixon urged the Ninety-first Congress to pass a bill
transferring forty-eight thousand acres of the Blue Lake lands back to the
Taos, and on 15 December of that year, Nixon signed House Resolution
(H.R.) 471 into law, settling an Indian claim by awarding land rather than
cash for the first time in the history of United States-Indian relations. 3
Despite its landmark significance, however, the Blue Lake case languishes
in relative obscurity in the annals oftwentieth-century "success" stories involving Native Americans' struggles against the United States government. 4 More
famous, for instance, is the so-called Boldt Decision of 1974, which reinstated
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fishing privileges to the Swinomish Indians of the Pacific Northwest.' When
one considers that this restoration of usufruct (usage rights) is often cited as
perhaps the high-water mark ofIndian achievement in reclamation petitions
filed against the U.S. government, the Taos' victory in recovering direct ownership of their appropriated lands appears even more extraordinary. Thus, the
Blue Lake case raises the intriguing question: why did the Taos Indians enjoy such success while so many other Native American groups settled for
much less or failed outright in their bids to ~egain lands taken from them by .
the government?
An examination of the extensive MIA files on Blue Lake and the personal
papers of four individuals instrumental in the fight suggests two answers. 6
First, the Taos and their supporters distinguished the Taos' claim from other
reclamation cases by linking the possession of Blue Lake directly to the preservation of their religious freedom. Indeed, the Taos were the only Native
American group to file a land claim rooted almost exclusively in the protection of spiritual practices, as opposed to building an appeal based primarily
on legal or economic grounds. Second, in the five years immediately preceding the passage ofH.R. 471, the Taos and their advocates waged an aggressive
publicity campaign that, by the late 1960$, had made Blue Lake, in the words
of one Nixon staffer, "a national symbol to American Indians."i The combination of these two elements won the Pueblos the support of the Nixon Administration,which provided the political capital necessary for Congress to
override the objections of Senator Anderson and the Department ofAgriculture and return BIue Lake to the Taos.
Blue Lake, the Taos Indians, and the
United States, 1906-1946

Reviewing the opening years of the twentieth century helps explain how the
loss offorty-eight'thousand acres ofNew Mexico woodland and the cerulean
pool standing at its center could motivate the intensely private Taos to pursue a highly publicized and bitter struggle to regain it. At first glance, the
government's confiscation of the Blue Lake territory in 1906 did not seem
overly threatening to the Taos. In fact, Bert Phillips, Carson National Forest's
first ranger, believed that the appropriation of the tract would actually benefit the Taos by limiting non-Indian access to the area, and the first several
years following the creation of the preserve proved him right. Indeed, as
Phillips recalled years later, "I saw that there were good homestead sites in
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the Forest, but because of the Indians' prior use and the whole intention of
setting this area aside, I refused to give any permits to applicants anywhere in
the watershed."8
Concerned, however, thattheir exclusive use of Blue Lake and its surrounding lands might nevertheless be jeopardized, the Taos-with the assistance of
the Indian Affairs Office-tried twice to have the area designated as an executive order reservation for their pueblo, in 1914 and again in 19169 Both efforts
failed, and the Indians' fears were soon realized when Phillips's less sympathetic successor, Elliott Barker, began to issue grazing permits to non-Indians
in 1918.10 Even more troubling to Taos Pueblo was that Barker opened the area
to tourists by cutting extensive trails through the forest and stocked the watersincluding Blue Lake-with trout for recreational fishing. One historian has
written, "In the three short years of his superintendency, Barker personally
oversaw the destruction of the Indians' centuries-old exclusive-use rights."ll
The Taos' fortunes seemed to improve somewhat in 1924, however, with
the passage of the Pueblo Lands Act, a Congressional measure aimed at resolving the myriad Indian land-ownership problems in New Mexico. l2 The
Indians presented their case in 1926 to the Pueblo Lands Board, arguing that
the government owed significant compensatory payments for territory taken
from the Taos, including a sizable portion now occupied by the non-Iridian
town of Taos, three miles south of the pueblo village. The Indians, however,
offered to waive their rights to the township property if the board would grant
the pueblo ownership of the fifty thousand acres surrounding Blue Lake.
Incredibly, the board accepted the Indians' offer but then failed to include
this agreement in its subsequent report to Congress. Thus, the Taos had for~
feited nearly $300,000 and received absolutely nothing in return. 13
Disgruntled but unbowed, the Taos continued to push for an equitable
resolution to the problem of the Blue Lake lands. Another glimm~r of hope
appeared with John Collier's appointment as commissioner of Indian affairs
in 1933. Collier Was well respected among many Native Americans throughout the country for his work in protecting Indian rights and was renowned for
his strenuous opposition to assimilationist policies. No group enjoyed a better relationship with him than the Taos. Greatly inspired by his visit to the
pueblo in 1920, Collier later remarked that he felt as if he had discovered a
"red Atlantis," and he wanted at once to share it with the rest of the world but
also to ensure the survival of its cultural integrity.14 Thirteen years later, upon
assuming his post in President Franklin Roosevelt's administration, Collier
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sought to make good on the second half of that resolution, helping engineer
legislation that would restore control of at least some of the lost lands to the
Taos. Again, however, the Indians received far less than they had requested.
Submitted in 1933, the bill, H.R. 4014, provided the Taos with a fifty-year renewable exclusive-use permit but it applied to only three days a year (the end of
August during their annual religious trek to Blue Lake) and left the entire contested area under the ownership and direct control of the Forest Service.
The problem~ with Forest Service contr~l quickly became clear. During
the early 1940s, recreational lISe of the forest rose dramatically, as hunters,
fishermen, and campers arrived in growing numbers to enjoy the beauty and
sporting opportunities of northern New Mexico. Furthermore, non-Indian
ranchers grazed more animals on larger sections of the Taos' former land
than ever before, and the Department ofAgriculture even approved logging
operations in select parts of the preserve. I) By the middle of the decade, Taos
Pueblo's cause seemed lost, and its members watched with de'spair as their
holy sanctuary was subjected to constant violation.
"Our Ancient Way of Life": Taos Pueblo and the
Importance of Blue Lake

What made the return of Blue Lake so vitally important to the Taos? The
answer offered by one observer is succinct and poignant: "The Taos Indians
have always believed that the' waters of Blue Lake are the source of all life for
them."16 For an agricultural people such as the Taos, this answer was literally
true. Archaeological evidence suggests that the Indians used the area northeast of the pueblo for hunting and farming as early as A.D. 1350 -land made
arable by the waters of the Rio Pueblo de Taos, whose source was Blue Lake. 17
Moreover, beyon<1 irrigating nearby fields and attracting game, the stream
ran right through the settlement, providing the Taos with both water and a
constant reminder of their dependence on Blue Lake.
Of greater importance to the pueblo, however, was the pool's religious significance. Among the most conservative ofNorth American Indian groups, the
Taos clinged to their ancestral traditions perhaps more tenaciously than any.
other indigenous community in the United States, resisting conveniances of
modern life such as telephones, automobiles, and electricity. IS Lying at the
heart of this conservatism were their religious beliefs preserved largely intact
despite the Taos' three centuries of contact with Spaniards, Mexicans, and
. Anglos.
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One Taos Indian has described Pueblo religion as "a mosaic composed of
bits and pieces ofknowledge known only to a restricted number ofindividuals."
Very little Taos ritual, ceremony, or belief has been revealed to outside obserVers. 19 The community places much importance on its ceremonial calendarwhich includes ritual dances and rites of purification -and on the six all-male
kivas, underground ceremonial centers that initiate select boys between 'ages
seven and ten into the religious life of the community.10 Probably the most
essential ingredient of Taos religion, however, is the village's relationship to
nature. In a 1961 address to the MIA titled "Our Ancient Way of Life," Taos
Indian Severino Martinez noted, "we don't have gold temples ... but we have
a sign of a living God to who [sic] we pray- the living trees, the evergreen and
spruce and the beautiful flowers and the beautiful rocks.... We have this proof
of sacred things we deeply love, deeply believe."11 By all accounts, Blue Lake
stands literally and figuratively at the center of the Taos' cosmology; it is the
pueblo's most revered shrine and the site of an annual pilgrimage made by
every member ofthe community. Likewise, the lands surrounding the pool are
just as important, connected to Blue Lake by an intricate ecological and, the
Taos believe, spiritual web. ll
Thus, Forest Service management of the sacred territory posed a significant threat to the Taos, because the government allowed and even encour c
aged the incursions of strangers into the area. Not just the beer cans and
fishing lines polluting the waters of their "church," as the Indians regularly
referred to Blue Lake, caused them such anxiety, but more vexing for the
Taos was the loss of privacy that they deemed necessary to preserve their religion, the delicate threads from which the fabric of Taos society and its institutions were woven. One Taosefio noted in the 1930S, "our ways would lose
their power if they were known. People have learned the ways of the other
Pueblos, and those Pueblos have lost their power."13 Supporting this claim
years later, anthropologist John Bodine testified before Congress that if"Blue
Lake and the surrounding lands are not returned to the tribe it will effectively
destroy Taos culture."14 The Pueblos' struggle to recover the area, therefore,
was not just another land dispute between Native Americans and the United
States government. To the Taos, the fight was even more basic than thatit was a matter of cultural life or death.

The Indian Claims Commission and the MIA
Taos efforts to regain Blue Lake might have ended by midcentury were it not
for the advent of the Indian Claims Commission. Created in 1946 as a quasi-
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OLiVER LA FARGE, PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATiON ON

1937
(Photograph courtesy Library of Congress.)

AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS, IN

judicial branch of Congress, the ICC was a last-ditch attempt to adjudicate
long-standing Native American claims against the United States 25 Set to expire just five years later (although it was renewed numerous times before 1978
to deal with the volume of Indian petitions), the legislation governing the
ICC offered Indian groups a final opportunity to settle outstanding legal differences with the federal government. Wary in light of their past frustrations,
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the Taos believed nevertheless that the ICC might ultimately provide them
with the means to obtain a favorable decision regarding their sacred lands.
However, members of the Pueblo Council, the community's governing body,
felt that the Taos needed first to secure additional support to help them in their
fight. Fortunately, they had to look no farther than Santa Fe. Lying seventy
miles to the south\\;est, the city was the home of Oliver La Farge, president of
the Association on American Indian Affairs.
The MIA, formed in 1933 by the merger of the National Association on
Indian Affairs (formerly the Eastern Association on Indian Affairs) and the
American Indian Defense Association, assisted Native Americans in protecting their constitutional rights and working to improve their quality of life.
Like John Collier, L~ Farge, who began his second term as MIA president
in 1948, had a special relationship with the Taos, which began in earnest during a trip to the Southwest that he made on behalf of the Association in 1934As La Farge explained years later, he found the Taos unique among the indigenous groups that he had encountered in New Mexic'oand Arizona: "Few
other tribes have preserved so intact the beauty of the Indian way oflife. This
beauty shows in their rituals, in their costume, and in the people themselves-their physical appearance, their poise, and their humor."z6 By the
time a delegation from Taos approached him formally in 1950 to seek the
Association's help, La Farge had lived in Santa Fe for more than a decade and
had become a trusted friend to the Indians.
Scarred by more than thirty years of failed attempts to recover Blue Lake,
the Taos devised a different strategy for appealing to the ICC. This time, instead
ofseeking any mixture offinancial compensation and an expanded use permit,
they decided to push for fee title to fifty thousand acres ofland adjacent to the
pueblo. Such title would give the Taos, rather than the government, ownership
of the disputed areaY La Farge, however, advocated a much more cautious
proposal. As he explained to the Taos, the ICC was authorized to award only
monetary settlements-not territory-to Native American groups proving
their cases; .only an act of Congress could effect a land transfer. To the MIA
legal counsel, he explained, "I am firmly opposed to the idea of asking to have
any ofthese lands conveyed to Taos Pueblo under fee patent, and I believe that
an attempt to do so would be politically impracticable."zR In short, La Farge
believed that the government would never surrender its right to the land.
Proposing a more realistic solution, he urged the Pueblo Council first to
seek an airtight use permit for a vastly enlarged area of the Blue Lake lands
and second to reevaluate the situation. z'! The Taos had little choice but to
follow La Farge's directive, because the MIA president said that he would
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withhold organizational support of their cause if they insisted on pursuing
another route. His plan called for the introduction of a bill that would expand
the Jaos' use permit, while the pueblo's ICC petition -filed in August 1951was pending before the tribunal. In the event that the ICC returned a favorable decision, the Taos could then use such a verdict to leverage further
concessions from the government.
To be sure, the political climate surrounding Native American issues at
midcentury shaped La Farge's strategy to a considerable extent. Following the
Second World War, the "Congressional pendulum" swung back toward assimilation, as Republican lawmakers repudiated the self-determination policies that
Collier and the Roosevelt administration had advocated in the 193os.30 Seeking
to trim the perceived budgetary excesses of the New Deal. and to drive Indians
off reservations and into "mainstream" American society, legislators proposed
to end federal support to Native American communities. Termination, as this
policy came to be known, had catastrophic consequences for many Indian
people, as governmental relief for vital social services - including health care
and education-dried up practically overnight, exacerbating the already dire
poverty of groups such as the Menominees of Wisconsin and the Paiutes of
Nevada. 3!
Considering the growing legislative hostility toward Native Americans
during the 195os, La Farge wanted to avoid any sharp confrontations with
lawmakers, parti~ularly proassimilationists who would strenuously resist a
direct grant ofland to Indians -with its obvious anti-assimilationist implicationsY Moreover, in the early 195os, as MIA president, La Farge offered a
qualified endorsement of terminfltion, believing that the total integration of
Indians into greater United States society was all but inevitable anyway33 La
Farge clearly questioned the political viability of the Taos request for ownership of the Blue Lake lands, decidingin the end that a less radi~al use permit authorized at the government's discretion was a more feasible goal. Such
factors help explain the cautious nature ofthe Association's initial support for
the Indians' plight.
During the 1950S La Farge's correspondence underscores the MIA's circumspect approach toward the Taos case in the early years of its involvement.
For instance, the president-and theorganization-emphasized the legal dimensions of the petition instead of stressing the Taos' special religious concerns. In correspondence. with Congressional representatives and federal
officials, La Farge cast the Indians' cause in the more established terms of
Native American claims disputes, focusing on governmental injustice and the
righting of old wrongs. For instance, in a memorandum to Senator Anderson,
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La Farge wrote, "What I have seen of the evidence now in the hands of the
Pueblo's attorneys definitely shows that Taos has a strong case. Justice demands that this case be heard."J4 A petition filed by the pueblo (but probably
written by La Farge) in 1955 captured the spirit of the MIA's initial strategy:
the legal argument focused almost entirely on the Taos' continual occupation of the land, Spanish and Mexican recognition of their property rights
through 1848, and the questionable actions of the federal government in 1906
and afterwards. J5 Yet the petition only made passing mention of Blue Lake's
religious significance to the Taos.
Over the next few years, however, La Farge changed his mind and shifted
the MIA strategy with respect to the Taos' claim. First, research by MIA
lawyers preparing for the ICC hearing turned up additional evidence that the
government had used legal trickery to hinder the Taos' case. Particularly disturbing to La Farge was the revelation that the Department of Agriculture
had modified the wording of a 1933 ruling on Blue Lake by the Senate Indian
Affairs Committee. Originally giving the Taos exclusive use, that decision
had later been narrowed to read "exclusive use during religious ceremonials
for such limited periods as may be agreed upon by their representatives and

the Supervisor of the Carson National Forest. The public may be admitted at
other times" (emphasis added).Jfi In 1940 the Department ofAgriculture curtailed these privileges even further by again altering the use permit, this time
to limit the Taos' rights of exclusivity to just three days a year. 37 La Farge,
moreover, had abandoned any terminationist leanings he may have harbored
in light of his discouraging dealings with Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Dillon S. Myer and his successor, Glenn Emmons. J8
_Second and more important, though, wasLa Farge's deepened understanding of the profound religious significance of Blue Lake to the Indian~. Several
times, the Pueblo Council made small monetary contributions to the Association, which La Farge interpreted as thanks for the MIA's support in the struggle.wMoreover, in the course of several meetings, the sincerity and tenacity of
the community's elders impressed La Farge. Recalling one such encounter, La
Farge wrote Executive Director La Verne Madigan of the MIA:
They [the Indians] then restated the vital importance to Taos Pueblo
of the Blue Lake Area.... They reminded me that the whole pattern
of Taos life that they are maintaining depends on their religion, and
their religion in turn depends on their sacred area. Their earnestness
and intensity when they discuss this matter is extremely moving.
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Later in the same note, La Farge explained that he felt "under considerable
obligation to try and get results for this Pueblo." Afterward he lapsed into a
short but impassioned recapitulation'ofthe government's actions in defrauding the Taos. 40
By 1963, La Farge accepted the Indians' conviction that only Taos ownership
ofthe landwould meet the tribe's needs, although he persuaded them that title
. in trust, rather than fee, was both better for the Indians (land held in trust by
the government carried with it no tax obligations for the owner) and more practical. 41 In addition, the Forest Service's increasing issuance of recreational use
and grazing permits to non-Indians-without stipulated Pueblo consentcoupled with growing talk of timber harvesting near the lake, persuaded La
Farge that the government and the Indians could not "share" the area. In a
letter written only days before his death in August 1963, La Farge explained to
John Collier, "In the course ofthe past thirteen years a number ofoccurrences
have led me to conclude that the Indians are right in desiring outright title. I
am sure it is even less of a surprise to you than it is to me when one finds that
a group ofIndians is a better judge of its own affairs than we are."42
Just as La Farge changed his mind about seeking title for the territory, so
too did he adjust the MIA's strategy for attaining the Indians' goals. In the
1950S the Association had argued the Taos' case like any number of other
Native American claims disputes, but in the 1960s the MIA pursued a different plan of attack. Perhaps invigorated by La Farge's own realization that
religion was important to the pueblo; the Association's attorneys began to
stress this aspect of the petition. For instance, in 1961 MIA counsel wrote
Secretary ofthe Interior Stewart Udall: "Under the administration ofthe Forest Service the use of this area for hunting, fishing and camping has steadily
increased to the point that the religious feelings of the Pueblo are severely
affronted. The only solution is the total exclusion of non-Indians from the
area."43 Elsewhere, chiefMIA lawyer Richard Schifter explained to a Department of Agriculture official, "The Taos Indians are unique ... in the degree
to which they have retained their ancient ways and to the extent that they
focus their religious interests and practices on natural shrines."44
Appeals such as these marked the substance ofMIA contributions to the
Blue Lake fight in the years immediately following La Farge's death. Convinced that the success or failure of the Taos Pueblo's case hinged on the
ability ofthe Indians and their advocates to capitalize on the pueblo's exceptionalism, the Association plotted a new course of action. This strategy emphasized features of the Taos' suit that would distinguish their case from other
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claims. Especially important was linking Taos Pueblo ownership of Blue
Lake to the protection of its people's freedom of religion. Moreover, MIA
leadership recognized the need to take the fight from northern New Mexico
and Washington, D.C., to the rest of the country.
A New Approach: "The Blue Lake Appeal" and S. 3085

The growth ofIndian activism in the early 1960$ undoubtedly influenced the
Association's decision to raise national awareness of the Taos case. Inspired
by the anxieties and disappointments of the termination era's "barren years,"
young, college-educated Indians renewed the push for self-determination,
rejecting the "Uncle Tomahawks" in their communities who favored mediation with the federal government on terms set by the United States. 45 Against
the larger backdrop of the Civil Rights movement (which Indians avoided
but from which they clearly benefited), several highly publicized events in
the first half of the decade drew attention to the political struggles of Native
Americans. 46 Chief among these protests was a series of "fish-ins" staged in
the spring of 1964 in the Pacific Northwest. These demonstrations-attended
by such well-known figures as Marlon Brando and Jane Fonda-protested
the government's abrogation of fishing privileges guaranteed by treaty to several groups of Indians in Washington state. 47 In addition to the handful of
nationally prominent individuals, more than one thousand Indians from fiftysix tribes - ranging from Florida Seminoles to Michigan Potowatomis - traveled to Washington state in support of the embattled Yakima, Muckleshoot,
Puyallup, and Nisqually Indians, heralding the arrival of a nationwide movement for Native American rights. 48
Although the Taos Indians and the MIA must have been aware of these
developments, neither the pueblo nor its advocates consciously linked the
Blue Lake recovery effort to such events. 49 Two factors may help to explain
this surprising circumstance. First, the most important figures in early 1960s
Native American activism were younger, urban Indians who had lived off the
reservation for years and belonged to pan-Indian political organizations such
as the National Indian Youth Council. The Taos, on the other hand, were
among the most conservative Indian groups in the country, and they were
dominated by elders who resolved not to compromise traditional values in
pursuit of any goals, even political ones such as the repossession of Blue
Lake m Thus, the pueblo was unlikely to seek the support of young, non-Taos
political radicals in their fight. Moreover, because the MIA repeatedly em-
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phasized the unique nature of the Taos petition, any attempt to incorporate
the struggle for Blue Lake within the larger movement for Indian civil rights
threatened to remove the linchpin of exceptional ism, making this "just another Indian claims case."
Regardless of its relative nonparticipation in the Indian activism of the early
1960s, the MIA sought nevertheless to capitalize on the heightened national
awareness aroused by the "fish-ins" and other such protest events. Nowhere was
this commitment to an aggressive public relations campaign more evident than
in the Association's publication of The Blue Lake Appeal, an eight-page brochure that appeared in 1965. Planning for this booklet began shortly after La
Farge's death and represented new Executive Director William Byler's resolve
to step up efforts to recover the territory. Speaking at a Taos Pueblo Council
meeting in September 1964, Byler explained that the recruitment of churches
and Congressional members was essential to their cause, a suggestion that
resonated with Corinne Locker, the field secretary in the MIA's southwest
office and former assistant to La Farge. 51
Described as "something of a public relations genius," Locker quickly
conceived the idea ofpublishing a short, hard-hitting pamphlet that could be
sent to newspapers, politicians, churches, and foundations all over the country in an attempt to generate national support for the Indians. 52 In early 1965
Locker carefully plotted with Byler the MIA's plan for the circular: "Three
major areas should receive emphasis: religion, conservation, and legality.
The most telling will be the religious.... First part: 30-year struggle to regain
possession of holy sanctuary - perhaps phrased in such a way as to suggest
Bethlehem."53 As this blueprint indicates, ~hile Locker and Byler retained
the traditional legal arguments in favor of the Taos and added information on
the Indians' commitment to environmental preservation, the heart of the
publication would be the appeal to religious liberty.54
Plans for the brochure received a major boost on 8 September 1965; when
the Indian Claims Commission released its judgment on the Taos' case,
more than fourteen years after the Indians and the ~IA had filed suit. The
court ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the pueblo, finding not only that the
United States had illegally extinguished the Taos' aboriginal title to the land
in 1906, but also that the government had cheated the Indians out of more
than $300,000 in compensation. On these grounds, the commission issued
an interlocutory order for a reassessment of the territory's worth, followed by
the payment of an appropriate indemnity. Although pleased with the findings, the Indians declined to accept a financial settlement, planning as before
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to use the ruling as leverage to win title to the land. 55 The MIA, meanwhile,
printed excerpts from the decision in the centerfold of the pamphlet, along
with striking pictures ofBlue Lake, the pueblo buildings, and members of the
community. Brimming with confidence, the Association mailed several
hundred copies of the brochure, Blue Lake Appeal, to newspapers, churches,
foundations, and other people and organizations in the fall of 1965.
The results were quick and impressive. Newspapers across the country
printed editorials supporting Taos Pueblo, with virtually all commentators
emphasizing the religious aspects of the Taos' case. A column in the Minneapolis Tribune, for instance, captured just the sentiment for which Locker
and Byler had hoped. Opening with a passage about the Red Deer Dance,
one of the group's annual rituals, the author explained:
These secret and sacred rites that bring the Taos Pueblo Indians to a
unity with nature are practiced today with little change from the ways
of centuries gone by.... Diversity in our midst-whether it be that of
the Taos Indians and their sacred lake, or that of any other American
cultural group - is an asset to be cherished. 56
Elsewhere, the New York Times urged that Congress enact legislation returning Blue Lake to Taos Pueblo, calling the government's actions of 1906 and
afterwards "a historic injustice."57
The MIA, however, did not limit its public relations work to the publication and dissemination of The Blue Lake Appeal. About the same time that the
pamphlet was distributed, the Association called on its members to begin a
letter-writing campaign aimed at legislators in preparation for the introduction
of a bill on Taos Pueblo's behalfthe following spring. MIA members sent hundreds of notes-some strongly worded -to Capitol Hill and the White House,
and again the results were overwhelming. 58 One woman wrote her <=ongressional representative and afterwards dropped a line to Byler, explaining why
she had been happy to. take up the Taos' cause: "My family has had the opportunity to come and have some knowledge of the people of Taos Pueblo. We
admire their independence and the vitality of their culture."59
These developments helped nudge New Mexico senator Clinton P. Anderson to introduce Senate Bill 3085 in March 1966. For more than a decade,
MIA officials had been in regular contact with Anderson, a Democrat,
former secretary of agriculture, and one of the Senate's most powerful members. Given his standing, the Taos and the Association deemed Anderson's
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(Photograph, Clinton P. Anderson Papers, courtesy Center for Southwest Research,
Zimmerman Library, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.)

support crucial; securing it, however, was another matter, because Anderson
had close ties to large timber and mining interests in New Mexico, industries
that stood to lose valuable extractive opportunities if the Indians were to own
the Blue Lake lands outright. Perhaps bowing to ten years of MIA lobbying
efforts, Anderson finally proposed a bill that would grant nearly fifty thousand
acres to the Taos, although he did so "by request," a congressional convention
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"often denoting lukewarm support of, if not actual opposition to, the stated
legislation."6o As explained by William C. Schaab, an attorney who joined the
Indians' fight in 1968, Anderson saw this proposal as "a way to set-up a [monetary] settlement and get rid ofthe issue."6l At the same time, Florida congressman James Haley, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs,
introduced H.R. 15184 as a companion bill to Anderson's legislation.
If indeed the senator intended to "get rid ofthe issue," he succeeded in the
short run, helping to kill the measure in the Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee before it could reach the Senate floor for debate. That spring the
hearings on the proposed legislation, however, served remarkably well to
promote the MIA's strategy of focusing increased attention on the Taos'
dilemma, with special emphasis on their unique religious needs. Of critical
importance was the flood of support from church organizations and officials.
In Byler's opinion, religious associations were one of the two groups- along
with members of Congress-whose backing was pivotal. 61 Particularly gratifying to the Taos Pueblo and its advocates was the strong endorsement of the
National Council of Churches (NCC) represented at the hearings by the
Rev. Serge Hummon. His eloquent testimony on the Indians' behalf equated
Blue Lake with "cathedrals, mosques, and temples," describing it as a structure "of singular sanctity and significance." He then went on to note that,
"There is significant merit in the tribe's claim of property rights ... but to it
is added an additional, and in some respects weightier, argument: that the
lake is essential to the religious life of the tribe...."63 Such support from a
nationally'respected and "main-line" religious organization helped translate
the Taos' claims into terms that would appeal to a larger American public,
one hopefully concerned with the First Amendment guaraatee of religious
liberty.64
Although Anderson did not openly oppose S. 3085 in the subcommittee
hearings-to do so would have been unthinkable, as he had, after all, authored
the legislation in the first place - he made his uneasy feelings known to other
senators. Indeed, his queries to the Indians and their counsel, while polite,
betrayed his loyalty to both the timber industry and the Forest Service, a branch
of the Department ofAgriculture that Anderson headed in the 1940S.65 He expressed his strongest objection through others, particularly Louis S. Clapper of
the National Wildlife Federation. While Clapper articulated several reasons
that a congressional return of the land would be unwise, he focused his arguments on the adverse precedent that an award of real estate instead of money
to an Indian community would set. 66 Indeed, Clapper conjured for the sub-
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committee a future scenario in which formerly public lands would become offlimits to all but the Indians who claimed them and the country's wildlife would
become endangered from a lack of federal oversight. 67
Such charges might have gone unchecked had not a surprising source, a
high-ranking government official, stepped in to deliver expert testimony.68 In
his appearance before the subcommittee, Secretary of the Interior Stewart
Udall challenged this question of precedent and made the strongest case yet
for the exceptional ism of the Taos' claim. He explained:
Three main arguments have been expressed against enactment of this
bill. Foremost is that a precedent will be set and that other Indian
tribes will want lands rather than money from the Indian Claims
Commission. We do not share this concern. In many cases, the lands
for which tribes are compensated are not in the proximity of their
present holdings. Few of the tribes have expressed any such desire [for
land instead of money]. We would not consider a grant ofland in this
case as opening the door for favorable action on similar future requests.
In our view, the religious significance of this land to the Taos Pueblo
Indians warrants favorable action as an exception to the general rule. 69
No other witness that spring did more than Udall to legitimate the Taos' petition, counter the opposition's objections, and distinguish the Pueblos' case
from all other Indian suits against the government. 71l Indeed, Udall's testimony-whether inadvertently or by design-confirmed and strengthened
the MIA's strategy to recover Blue Lake by reinforcing the group's unique
religious needs in a very public forum. Still more support along these lines
carne from a host ofIndian communities, whose letters echoed Udall's assertions about the Taos' unusually strong relationship to the land.'1
The death knell for S. 3085 sounded with Anderson's announcement on
12 July 1966 that he had developed plans for a new bill that would give the
Indians only 3,100 acres ofland in trust title, with a use permit for the rest.
This plan was unacceptable to the Indians, and with both sides unwilling to
budge, S. 3085 died in committee, Qrphaned by Anderson and opposed by
the Department of Agriculture 72 Moreover, the House buried H.R. 15184whose passage was already unlikely, given Anderson's inevitable opposition,
should it ever reach the Senate -at the bottom of its agenda, where the resolution expired bef~)[e recejving consideration. The death ofboth bills- but
especially S. 3085 ~ in the summer of 1966 was bitterly disappointing to the
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Taos and the MIA. They had won a favorable decision from the ICC and
secured the introduction of legislation in Congress, only to watch it wither
on the vine. The Indians and their advocates could take some solace, however, in the knowledge that their case drew national attention to the issue and
attracted support from numerous prominent organizations and individuals.
They resolved to continue the fight, to reject any monetary offers, and to
pursue title to the fifty thousand acres surrounding Blue Lake.

New Advocates, Familiar Tactics
Particularly active in the wake of S. 3085's defeat was Dean Kelley, director
of the NCe's Commission on Religious Liberty. Convinced that still more
national publicity was needed in an effort to overcome opposition to Blue
Lake, Kelley asked Paul Bernal, general interpreter for the Pueblo Council
. and the Taos' chief liaison to the MIA, "Do you think it would be useful to
try to arrange for several religious leaders to make a 'pilgrimage' up to Blue
Lake to focus national attention on your claim, or would this seem too much
like 'grand standing'?"7l As it turned out, no such dramatization was necessary, as ABC Television proposed less than a month later to film a special
program on the case, as part ofthe network's Directions series on culture and
religion. 'The Sacred Lake ofTaos" aired that November, bringing the Taos'
story to countless homes across the country.
Kelley's other ideas included publishing an article that focused on the
government's impairment of the Taos' religious liberty. Late that spring, A
Journal ofChurch and State ran the piece, in which Kelley attacked the opposition to S. 3085 and singled out Anderson for special criticism. In addition
to his concerns over precedent and lost timber, Anderson had also questioned the Pueblos' need for such a large "church," arguing, "If they [the
Taos] refuse to take a 3,15o-acre tract and maintain it as sacred, we are bound
to have some doubts of their religious sentiment."74 Firing back in the editorial, Kelley wrote, "The relationship between the tribe and the land is an
organic one; they feel that the entire watershed is integral to the life of the
tribe .... If the trees are cut, the tribe bleeds. If the springs or lakes or streams
are polluted, the lifestream of the tribe is infected."75 Such sentiments, expressed by a religious leader in a national journal were weighty and convincing. Byler, for example, noting the critical importance of the NCC's
endorsement, explained, "I anticipated the skepticism with which the Congress would view such a claim if asserted by the Pueblo alone, without the
support of nationally recognized religious groupS."76
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Any momentum that these efforts might have built in preparation for the
next session of Congress, however, evaporated in the winter of 1966-1967.
Corinne Locker, perhaps the most dedicated and trusted of the Taos' nonIndian advocates, filed a censorious report with the MIA's top officials in late
November. Titled "The Association and the Taos Blue Lake," the meticulous
thirty-five-page memorandum charged that MIA attorneys on the case had
impeded the Indians' efforts to recover the area because of a serious conflict
of interest. In essence, Locker argued that lawyer Richard Schifter - who had
worked on the claim since the advent of the MIA's involvement-and his
associates began pushing for the Indians to accept an extended use permit,
along with the monetary compensation promised by the ICC when Anderson's opposition became clear. The legal counsel then believed that winning
title to any sizable tract ofland was next to impossible. Locker explained that
such a settlement was attractive to Schifter and his partners because it meant
they would finally be paid-handsomely-for their legal work on behalf of
the Pueblo. 77
Schifter and his associates vigorously contested Locker's report and soon
won the backing of Byler and eventually MIA President Alden Stevens, who
requested -and received - Locker's resignation in February 1967.78 This set
off a dizzying chain of events. Believing that their fiercest advocate had been
unjustly deposed, the Taos were furious. With the help ofConsuelo La Farge,
widow ofthe former MIA president, the Indians petitioned the Association's
Board of Directors to reinstate Locker, which they did later that month after
. Paul Bernal and a Pueblo Council delegation delivered an impassioned plea
at the MIA headquarters in Manhattan. With Locker back at work in Santa
Fe, order seemed restored to the Association and its plans for the Taos' case.
This "uneasy peace" lasted barely two months, splintering in April 1967
when Anderson introduced new legislation on Blue Lake, this time in earnest. Trying to bring the issue to a speedy resolution, Anderson proposed two
bills inimical to the Indians' wishes, although he claimed to have their best
interests at heart. 79 Both S. 1624 and S. 1625 provided for the return of only the
3,150 acres immediately surrounding Blue Lake-S. 1624 in fee title, S. 1625
in trust-with a permit for the use of an additional 29,000 acres. Such terms
would not prevent logging or unlicensed recreationaluse by non-Indians and
gave the Taos Pqeblo only a "small island" of territory with no explicit provision for access. Locker believed that the timing of Anderson's announcement was calculated to force the MIA's Board of Directors into accepting
this "compromise" at its annual meeting. An enraged Locker sent a telegram
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to board members, explaining that the vulnerability Anderson perceived in
the Association was the result of "an unholy alliance" between the attorneys
and head MIA officials. 8o Less than one week later, a bitterly divided board
voted to dismiss her.
The Taos responded quickly, informing the Association that the pueblo
chose to retain Locker and its regional attorney, Rufus G. Poole, and would
seek legal and public relations assistance from a source other than the MIA.
For its part, the Association dispatched board member Hildegarde Forbes to
Taos Pueblo to assess the situation. There she learned that the Taos - on
Locker's advice-had enlisted the National Council of Churches to replace
the MIA as their chief advocate. After a friendly conference with the Pueblo
Council, Forbes reported, rather smugly, to the board that her meeting had
smoothed any differences between the MIA and the Indians, so that "when
the NCC has become tired of this job, and if Mrs. Locker should fall by the
wayside, the Pueblo can then come back to the Association and ask for help
without loss of face."81 Privately, Forbes expressed relief that the MIA was
finally rid of the case, because the Association had "spent too much time,
energy and money tilting at windmills in the past year."82 Schifter underscored Forbes's characterization of the Taos' case as quixotic, explaining to
Byler that he gave the Indians no chance to secure title to the fifty thousand
acres over Anderson's objection. 83
Kelley and Locker were far more sanguine, however, and picked up
where the MIA had left off shortly before the controversy began. Fueling
their optimism was Florida congressman James Haley, who had responded
to Anderson's recent Senate bills with legislation of his own. Although it is
difficult to ascertain the source of Haley's loyalty to the Taos, one historian
has guessed that the congressman "thought the cause just and also seized an
opportunity to playa little political one-upmanship with Senator Anderson."84 Whatever his reasons, Haley's proposal, H.R. 3306, would return all
50,000 acres in trust to the Taos Indians, instead of the 3,150 acres recommended by the senator. With all three bills pending before their respective
committees, Kelley and Locker followed the same strategy - building a heavy
publicity campaign around the Taos' fight for religious freedom-that had
seemed to work so well in the winter of 1965 and spring of 1966. The enduring appeal of this plan to the tribe's advocates was soon justified, as the New
Mexico Council of Churches (NMCC)-which had avoided the i~sue in
1966-passed a resolution in November 1967 strongly supporting Haley's bill.
The NMCC based its endorsement on the fact that "Taos Pueblo's historical
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and religious claim to this land is overwhelmingly supported by the testimony
of the Indians themselves, the judicial findings of the ICC, the testimony of
expert witnesses, historians, anthropologists and religious authorities...."85
Clearly, an approach focusing on the spiritual plight of the Indians still had
political currency.
With hearings on the proposals of Anderson and Haley not scheduled to
begin until the following spring, Locker did what she could to keep the issue
alive in the public's mind. Undoubtedly, her most valuable contribution during this period, and probably in the entire campaign, was to oversee the formation of the National Committee for the Restoration of the Blue Lake
Lands to the Taos Indians. The project began in a 1967 conversation between
Locker and Consuelo La Farge about the need to attract other prominent
individuals to the Taos cause and raise money for their mounting legal bills.
Debuting in February 1968, the National Committee boasted a membership
list that read like a "who's who': ofAmerican religious, political, and business
leaders. Among others, the.list included Grace Collier (the former BIA commisioner's widow), department store executive John Wanamaker, writer Paul
Horgan, former interior secretary Stewart Udall, and Adlai Stevenson III.86
Like all efforts on behalf of the Taos at this time, the committee placed great
emphasis on the religious rights of the pueblo, as a letter from Kelley to
Locker reveals: "We have today distributed to the daily newspaper press and
a heavy list of religious periodicals ... your press release announcing the
Committee, as revised with a strengthened religious angle."87
Subcommittee hearings on H.R. 3306 opened on 9 May 1968. In preparation for the hearing, attorney William C. Schaab, serving in lieu of the
severely ill Rufus Poole, scheduled an impressive slate of witnesses and
drafted a comprehensive memorandum for distribution. In the memo,
Schaab penned the strongest words yet written on the matter, stressing the
importance of Blue Lake to the Taos' religion and their very survival, but he
added a qualification clearly aimed at Anderson: "Because of the essential
secrecy of its religion it has been difficult for the Pueblo to explain in terms
satisfactory to the American mind why it must control the entire watershed
of the Rio Pueblo."88 Kelley worried that this strategy might isolate some of
the Indians' supporters, but Schaab explained, "In my judgment, the secrecy
argument explains one of the sources of the religious significance ofthe Blue
Lake Area and also why the Indians have never been able to make a disclosure of their religious practices."89 The lawyer's words were prescient. Udall
and other witnesses used this rationale to bolster their case for the "singular"
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nature of the Taos' claim. In fact, so successful was Schaab's plan that, when
the bill finally emerged from the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs for the full
House vote, it passed unanimously. However, Anderson frustrated the Taos
Pueblo by killing the measure for a second time in the Senate.
But Haley was not easily deterred and promptly reintroduced the bill as H.R.

471 several months later on the first day of the new congressional session. Not
to be outdone, Anderson countered with S. 750, which would grant Taos
Pueblo exclusive use (not even title) to only 1,64° acres. As one historian has
noted, "Where each successive Haley bill was essentially identical to the previous proposal, each new Anderson proposal offered the tribe less and less
land."90 Although the senator suffered under the weight of increasingly negative public opinion, he remained steadfast in his opposition and made clear
that, if the Indians would not accept the "compromise" ofS. 750, there would
be no further legislative proposals from him. 91 The Taos response sharply criticized Anderson and flatly rejected his offer. 91 Meanwhile, debate on H.R. 471
began in May, passing the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs in June before winning the endorsement of the full House in September.
Richard Nixon and the Return of Blue Lake to the Taos Pueblo

Sensing that their window of opportunity might be closing, the Taos and their
advocates decided that, if the Taos were ever going to recover Blue Lake, they
needed to enlist additional political support that would embolden senators
to vote for a measure benefiting a New Mexico people opposed by the state's
own representative, the powerful Senator Anderson. Fortunately for the Taos,
a bit of "Hemingway luck" -as Corinne Locker called it-came their way
later that year. 93 In the fall of 1969, Barbara "Bobbie" Greene, a Yale-trained
lawyer with a profound interest in Indian education, began serving a White
House fellowship under Richard Nixon. Nixon's domestic affairs advisor,
John Ehrlichman, recruited Greene to assist with the administration's Native
American policy. Greene soon began work on the Blue Lake case, which had
been brought to her attention by the wife of Oklahoma senator Fred Harris. 94
A second stroke of luck for the Taos occurred in January 1970, when the
National Congress of American Indians announced at its annual meeting
that it would make Taos Pueblo's fight to regain Blue Lake its top legislative
priority for the year. Still more support came later that month when the National Council on Indian Opportunity released during a White House meeting a report stating, "Because the [pueblo's] problem is unique and because
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it has persisted over so many decades, we feel that the Taos struggle merits the
special attention of the Council."95 Evidently, the report made quite an impression on Nixon's vice president, Spiro T. Agnew, and the cabinet members in attendance, because Agnew ordered his staff to prepare background
information on the case.
Believing that "dealings with the White House had reached a critical
juncture," Taos Pueblo dispatched a delegation, including Locker, Schaab,
and Paul Bernal, to meet with administration officials at a conference arranged for the Indians by Greene. 96 In the wake of the meeting, the White
House fellow was convinced not only that the Taos cause was just but that it
represented a pivotal political opportunity for the Nixon Administration.
Writing to a staff member in the office of Presidential Counselor Leonard
Garment, Greene remarked:
I cannot stress enough the serious need to get this thing moving. Blue
Lake has become a national symbol to American Indians and its
significance is 'felt by those who are urban residents as well as those
who live on reservations. If we cannot deliver on this equitable and
legal claim, we will be creating a breach with the Indian community
that perhaps will be irreparable .... The Taos Pueblo Indians are
committed to the House passed bill [H.R. 471] and tl1e Indian
population as a whole strongly supports them. Furthermore, they have
generated a great deal of active sympathy among non-Indians 97
Likewise convinced by the Taos claim to Blue Lake, Agnew wrote Nixon in
late March, "After having reviewed the situation, it is my conclusion that the
equities lie with the Taos Pueblo Indians and that we should endorse H.R.
471 ... and should aggressively seek its enactment."98 Concerned less with
justice than political calculus, Garment advised Nixon that the Blue Lake
case "has snowballed and is now the single specific Indian issue.... A new
Indian policy needs a starting point. Blue Lake is just that-strong on the
merits, and powerfully symbolic."99
Beyond its emblematic significance, however, one other consideration
made Blue Lake an attractive issue for the Nixon Administration: politically
speaking, it was relatively safe. By the time Garment and other presidential
advisors were acquainted with the Taos' petition in 1969, the Indian activism
that began in the early 1960s had become increasingly militant. This "Red
Power" movement stood for the "right ofIndians to be free of colonialist rule
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and to run their own affairs."loo Like the protest actions earlier in the decade,
Red Power sought to focus national attention on such concerns as the government's shameless abrogation ofIndian hunting and fishing privileges and
the difficult socioeconomic conditions on the reservation. However, frustrated by continued federal indifference, Red Power activists adopted more
aggressive tactics at decade's end.
No group played a larger role in building and sustaining Red Power than
the American Indian Movement (AIM), which was formed in Minneapolis
in 1968. Although AIM spent much of its first year concerned with employment and educational issues, the group quickly adopted a more militant
stance, seen in its establishment of a camp in 1970 at the base of Mount Rushmore, meant to symbolize Lakota claims to the Black Hills. Moreover, AIM
inspired a generation of young activists such as the group calling itself "Indians of All Tribes," who in November 1969 seized the defunct federal penitentiary on Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay, demanding that the
government step up its assistance programs in Native American communities. Despite the government's attempts to dislodge them, the Indians managed to. hold Alcatraz until June 1971. 101
The White House learned of the Blue Lake case during the widely publicized Alcatraz occupation. Eager to appear responsive to Indian concerns but
hesitant to give in to radicals, Nixon saw in Taos Pueblo's suit a wonderful opportunity to galvanize support for his new policy ofIndian self-determination
without polarizing his conservative constituent base. 'o2 With such considerations in mind, Nixon made Blue Lake the focal point of a speech, delivered
on 8 July 1970, in which he noted, "For 64 years, the Taos Pueblo has been
trying to regain possession of this sacred lake and watershed area ... [the Taos]
consider such action essential to the protection and expression oftheir religious
faith .... I therefore take this opportunity wholeheartedly to endorse legislation
which would restore 48,000 acres of sacred land to the Taos Pueblo people."IOJ
The timing ofthis announcement was hardly coincidental: Senate hearings on
H.R. 471 were set to begin the following day, and Nixon was sending word to
its members that he wanted the bill passed.
Nixon got his wish. Now faced with the Nixon Administration's backing
of the Blue Lake initiative (which helped dissolve the Department of Agriculture's strident opposition), Senator Anderson saw that the tide had turned
permanently against him. He did not go down easily, however, introducing
amendments to the bill-even after it had passed the subcommittee-that
would have stripped pueblo control of the lands and undermined its water
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rights. The White House countered these moves with increased support, including a letter-writing campaign organized by Garment's office and aimed
at winning over any undecided senators. As its author explained, the Taos
case was "the only instance of a [Native American] claim for land, which
once restored, would not be subject to commercial development, but could
only be used for traditional and religious purposes."I04 Such appeals eroded
what was left of Anderson's support, and finally, on 2 December 1970, the
Senate voted 70 to 12 in favor of H.R. 471.
Thirteen days later, Juan de Jesus Romero, the cacique (spiritual leader)
of the Taos, led an Indian delegation to the White House for the bill-signing
ceremony. Present, too, were Corinne Locker and Paul Bernal, the two people most responsible for the Taos' victory. After greeting Romero, Nixon delivered a shortspeech that confirmed just how successful the strategy adopted
in the 1960s had been and that must have been especially gratifying to Locker
and Bernal among many others who had supported the Indians during the
course of their fight. After noting that the bill represented "justice," Nixon
went on to distinguish the Taos case from all others on the same religious
basis as had the MIA, the NCC, and a host of dedicated individuals: "Long
before any organized reli&ion came to the United States, for 700 years the
Taos Pueblo Indians worshipped in this place. We restore this place of worship to them for all the years to come."ID5 Whatever else Blue Lake and the
lands surrounding it might have meant to the Taos, most important to
Nixon - as to the Indians - was its religious significance. Indicating just how
powerful a national symbol the fight had become, the president reiterated his
hope that the return of Blue Lake marked the "start of a new road" in United
States-Indian relations, "one in which there will be more of an attitude of
cooperation rather than paternalism, one of self-determination rather than
termination, one of mutual respect."106
Epilogue

This study of the Taos recovery of Blue Lake raises a number of extremely
elusive questions, but several important conclusions can be drawn that suggest topics deserving further inquiry.107 First, the assurances of Stewart Udall
and William C. Schaab notwithstanding, the return of Blue Lake. to Taos
Pueblo did in fact set the legal staridard that so worried Clinton Anderson.
To be sure, even before the passage of H.R. 471, at least one other Indian
group had come forward with a land claim citing the so-called "Blue Lake

150 ~

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 76, NUMBER 2

precedent,"lIIK and as one historian notes, in the years following the Taos
Pueblo's victory, "millions of acres were returned to Indian tribes by judicial
or legislative action." These settlements were based at least in part on the
Taos decision. 109 Indeed, one of the most controversial claims currently sub
judice was almost certainly. inspired by the pueblo's struggle yo
Moreover, the return of Blue Lake also suggests an uncomfortable truth
about some of white America's perceptions of its reservation-bound neighbors: those Native Americans who most closely resemble the "ideal" indigenous type are easier for philanthropists, legislators, and even the general
public to support. Oliver La Farge captured this sentiment in a letter he wrote
shortly after attending a meeting of the Taos Pueblo Council in the 1950s,
explaining to his associates how this encounter had rejuvenated his enthusiasm for Indian advocacy: "I go through life telling myself that the fact that so
and so has a crew haircut, wears a necktie and business suit, does not mean
that he is any less an Indian. It is enormously relieving once again to sit with
Indians who completely look the part."11i
The Taos-clad in traditional garb and living in their traditional puebloqualified as perhaps the most "beautiful" of all North American Indian peoples, an attribute that clearly helped the Taos win assistance from individuals
and groups representing diverse political perspectives. It seems hardly accidental that the Taos would have been the one tribe that inspired John Collier's activist career, just as it is difficult to imagine Richard Nixon placing a
collection of similarly disenfranchised urban Indians at the center of his new
Native American policy. While the Taos case was indeed strong on its own
merits, there seems little doubt that more meaningful to the Pueblos' backers was the suit's powerful cultural symbolism: here were "real" Indians trying to maintain their noble ways in a changing and corrupt world.
Taos Pueblo's struggle to safeguard its traditions, however, has seen new
challenges arise in the years since the return of Blue Lake. Most significantly,
northern New Mexico has experienced dramatic population growth in the
last two decades to the point that in the early 1990S the Indians began to worry
once more about the erosion of their privacy. Instead of the old irritations,
such as trespassing by the occasional hunter or fisherman, the proliferation
of houses along the boundary set by Congress in 1970 posed a new threat.
Although Blue Lake itself was protected and the pueblo had recently won
back the so-called "Bottleneck" tract -a disputed 764-acre strip leading to the
watershed - the Taos became concerned about the rest of the area. III Would
its environmental integrity be compromised by the hordes of new residents
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in the region? Determined to preserve their people's solitude but lacking
legal claim to the land, the council elders opted for a different strategy. They
paid an estimated eleven million dollars in 1995 to buy up the remaining
property in the vicinity of Blue LakeY3
The pueblo chose an unexpected source to finance the purchase of this
territory, when one considers the Taos' cultural conservatism: they opened
a gambling casino in 1995, the profits from which they would use to make the
$864,000 annual payment on the land. While this decision perhaps underscored the tribe's commitment to protecting its religious shrines and practices
at all costs, building a casino also thrust the intensely private Taos into the
contentious debate in New Mexico (and the country at large) over gaming
on Indian reservations. Along with a number ofother Indian tribes in New
Mexico, the Taos endured numerous legal challenges from groups opposed
to gambling in the state, and the pueblo suffered constant anxiety that the
revocation of its casino permit would jeopardize the purchase of the Moreno
Ranch territory.1I4 Even when Indian gaming rights were finally affirmed in

1997 by an act of the New Mexico State Legislature, all tribes were forceel to
pay more than sixteen percent of their earnings to the state treasury, a sum'
that kept Taos Pueblo's bank account hovering near zero. 1I5 Although the
state legislature will soon consider a recent proposal that would reduce by
half the slot machine revenues required from each tribe with gaming operations,'--its passage is far from certain. 1I6
For the Taos, the outcome of this decision is only the most pressing concern regareling the tribe's ability to protect its sacred shrine and private religious rituals and beliefs. The pueblo's recently abandoned attempt to convert
a landmark hotel in Taos Village into the tribe's second gambling venue indicates that, even with the recovery of the Bottleneck and the purchase of the
Moreno Ranch land, the Pueblo perceives an on-going threat to Blue Lake,
one the Indians believe can only be forestalled through additional casino
revenues. 1I7 Meanwhile, the population' of northern New Mexico continues
to grow, and with it the demand for commercial and residential real estate,
suggesting perhaps that the battle for Blue Lake may not yet be over.
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